I’ve been confused a lot lately by contemporary coverage of what is being called the “extreme right”. The coverage basically focuses on several contradictory exclamations on how they might win and don’t have a big enough following to win. How their policies are so unpopular and they are defeating themselves and so if they win we are headed to autocracy and what democrats need to do to defeat them in the future should they win in ‘24.
Let’s take the second contradiction first because the inherent fallacy that if they win and create an autocracy would mean of course they would not allow an opportunity for an unfixed election beyond their assumption of taking power–that is to a great extent what an autocracy is.
Perhaps Goebbels said it best when he stated that just because his party assumed power democratically (not quite) that in no way meant they were bound to continue using democratic forms.
Which leads us to the first contradiction that they aren’t popular enough to win (don’t represent a majority) but that they might win a majority.
Well to understand this, let’s look at Germany in the 20’s. Most is so well known, there is no need to repeat. What I want to do is point to a few similar parallels.
1.Economic chaos and attempts to increase social safety nets that dissatisfied the economic elite. The Wall Street crash of ‘29 created an even greater depression because one-fourth of their debt was owned by America. Debt was called in creating greater economic upheaval than in the US. Finally at the Lausanne Conference in early ‘32 the Nazi war reparations were suspended indefinitely. A bit of stability was beginning to resume both because of greater confidence that the economy might be able to pull itself together. Under Brüning and later von Papen and, briefly, von Schleicher, there was an increase in state intervention in the economy. One example of this was the work creation schemes which began in the summer of 1932. These work creation schemes would later be expanded and reinvested in by the Nazis to combat unemployment. (So much for the “right” of Nazi government against. At the same time in “left” Russia, Stalin had assumed and taking away many of the socialist land redistributions that were becoming centralized by the local party organizations that were taking away vestiges of social redistribution. And this has always been a confusing point to me as the “communists” increasingly abandoned leftists policies of redistributions,while fascist Italy, and then Germany, Spain and Portugal would favor more social parity policies.)
But in the US, Roosevelt, facing the same social divide of those inclined to want a more fascist type government and a more communist type government, managed to minimize social disturbance.
2. First from the U.S. perspective what Roosevelt was able to accomplish in the 30’s, and this might be largely due to a more geographic division between the two opposing ideologies, was prevent a large intra-clash between them, and while both “communist” and “fascist” proponents did create some unrest, the avoidance of direct confrontation was probably key in navigating the stability of the government. While in Germany direct confrontations had been going on for some time forcing state police action to intervene and further increasing the instability. In 1932, yet another election was called in Germany, and the new German social policies were seemingly working as both communist and Nazis total vote percentages were reduced, and the Nazis lost several seats. Unhappy Hindenburg appointed yet another Chancellor. It was first offered to Hitler but without authority to proclaimArticle 48 (what we probably refer to as “executive orders”). The Nazis increased the violence in the streets, and heavily funded by the industrialist elite, and the fall of yet another Chancellor in short order, Hitler was offered the Chancellorship once again with Article 48 powers. The first order of business was the ability to use the state police powers in alignment with the SS to quickly crush street violence, increase investment in public works programs that reduced unemployment and garnered a lot of support for the repression of the Jews.
So make what you will of it, but the social unrest created a pathway for the minority party to seize power, and minus the war might have maintained that power as it did in Portugal, and then Spain. Of course the majority do not want an authoritarian government, but what the majority do want is stability and the appearance that the streets are not on fire. You might see a parallel in the increasingly violent ends during the French revolution that resulted in Napoleon’s rise to power, or the unrest in China after the collapse of the Japanese that Chiang failed to control and led to the Communist victory. Authoritarianism can often be seen as a cure to social unrest and lead to a minority’s success. So of course the Republicans do not need a majority to favor their policies, they only need a majority desire an end to social unrest, and creating that unrest is more important for their rise to power than being popular.